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Generations and Social Structures in Socialist 
Countries: The German Democratic Republic and  
East Germany in Comparison with North Korea 
Michael Hofmann & Bernd Martens ∗ 
Abstract: »Generationen und soziale Strukturen in sozialistischen Staaten: Die 
DDR und Ostdeutschland im Vergleich mit Nordkorea«. In this paper the devel-
opment of social structures and generations in the GDR is outlined, and it is 
compared with developments of the “people’s republic” of North Korea in three 
aspects. Firstly, the emergence of a socialist establishment, that means larger 
social milieus which are apparently loyal to the state, is interpreted as a basis 
for stabilization in the GDR and in North Korea. Secondly, in the GDR Western 
oriented alternative milieus and subcultures became important actors during 
the political upheaval during the end of the 1980s. There is, however, no evi-
dence of comparable intellectual or cultural counter-elites in opposition to the 
socialist establishment in North Korea. And third, the history of the GDR is dis-
tinguished by a sharply declining rate of integration of the younger genera-
tions into the socialist system. The last generations of the GDR are labelled with 
the adjectives “reserved and unadvised.” In contrast to the GDR, in North Korea 
each new generation seems to experience major historic events which had pos-
sibly had a constituting generative effect on some age cohorts. Thus, even the 
famine of the 1990s became a national challenge whose overcoming were laid 
in the responsibility of everyone, including the young generation. Finally, the 
conclusions of these differences between the former socialist states (using the 
example of GDR) and North Korea are discussed in the paper. 
Keywords: Generations, social structures, social milieus, social history of the 
German Democratic Republic. 
1.  Introduction1 
In this paper a historical perspective is unfolded in regard to two aspects: social 
structure and generation. The development of social structures in the GDR is 
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outlined and it is compared with the development in the “people’s democracy” 
North Korea. Indeed, we are in doubt whether the comparison does really jus-
tice to the developments in both countries which have a similar historic back-
ground of the emergence of Soviet-type socialism after 1945, even if, although 
they belong to different cultures. That makes understanding difficult, especially 
if processes seem to be rather weird in comparison with those in modern glob-
alised societies (Cumings 2015). Therefore, this paper has an exploratory and 
preliminary status.  
When describing the socio-structural and generational developments of 
countries that emerged under Soviet and Marxist influence in the aftermath of 
World War II, we find certain similarities and parallels. Similar characteristics 
of the socialist countries were the emergence of a socialist establishment during 
an early reconstruction period. In the case of the GDR, the fate of the socialist 
establishment after the social upheaval in 1989/90 is analysed in terms of social 
structure. In essence, the social establishment lost its political power during the 
transformation period, but succeeded in defeating its social positions.  
During the decline of the GDR the youth played an important role. It can be 
argued that the young people, who were trained in the post-war GDR for the 
setup of socialism and who reached leading positions during the 1950s and 
1960s, constituted the only true generation of the GDR. The mental distance of 
the youth and its opposition towards the social and political institutions grew 
with each subsequent age cohort. The failure of the state, ultimately visible in 
1989/90, can also be described as the disability to actually integrate these sub-
sequent young age cohorts in society.  
In reference to a comparative point of view, we describe two age cohorts – 
the “last generation” of the GDR (Martens 2015) and the people who experi-
enced the great famine in North Korea as child or teenager. The decisive differ-
ence between the two groups is the lack of resistance or opposition in North 
Korea, although seemingly growing conditions for an “unofficial culture” has 
come into existence.  
The article ends with three questions concerning future developments of so-
cial structure and generation in the case of North Korea. The preliminary and 
inquiring character of the conclusions underline once more the exploratory 
status of this paper. 
2.  Social Structural Similarities in Socialist Countries and 
the Socialist Establishment in the GDR 
All of the socialist countries which attributed themselves as people’s democra-
cies were marked by an historic break with the former bourgeois or feudal 
elites, which in turn aided the creation of a “socialist establishment” and left a 
decisive mark on the social structures of these respective countries. The “peo-
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ple’s democracies” or “workers’ and peasants’ states” such as East Germany, 
officially known as the German Democratic Republic (GDR), or North Korea 
represent (or represented) societies without any recognisable middle class(es). 
Instead, in these societies we find the masses, i.e. the workers and peasants, on 
one side of society, confronted by the socialist establishment on the other. 
The following explanations provide a brief look at the social history (or his-
tory of the social structure) of the GDR and eastern Germany:  
The Soviet zone of occupation in Germany after World War II did indeed 
witness radical changes. The old bourgeois and aristocratic functional elites 
(businessmen, politicians, bankers, military brass, many scientists, etc.) either 
fled from Soviet occupation or were de-Nazified, expropriated, and expelled 
from the country. During a tremendous mass educational campaign lasting 
from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s, a new generation of teachers, technicians 
and managers as well as leading administrators, security staff and political 
functionaries were trained. The early removal of educational barriers and the 
resulting mass-scale advancement into positions of social status and political 
power established social lifeworlds in the higher social echelons of the GDR 
defined by loyalty to the state and the party – this pertained to about 20% of the 
population, what we term “the socialist establishment.”  
There were essentially three possible paths to ascend into this establishment:  
First, there was political advancement, which can be seen when looking at 
functionaries staffing the organs of power (state officials, military and security 
personnel etc.). Those cadres formed the status and career oriented milieu. The 
main goal in the lives of these people consisted in climbing the social and ca-
reer ladder to top and mid-level leadership positions and gaining high social 
status and power. Party and state functionaries, the administrators of state pow-
er, primarily attended so-called ‘Party schools’ to study socialist law, military, 
Marxism-Leninism, or political economy.  
The second path of advancement was restricted to the economic system. The 
managers and administrators of nationalized industry (plant managers, engi-
neers, technicians) formed the rationalistic-technocratic milieu. The main goal 
in the lives of these people was making and shaping products, advancing pro-
cesses, and being efficient. The managerial elite in the GDR had a strong edu-
cational background in engineering. The directors of socialist industry had 
usually studied technical subjects, engineering, and later went through ad-
vanced education in socialist economics.  
Thirdly, the state exhibited a large demand for socialist culture and education, 
that is to say, creative artists, university professors, and academic staff who, with 
intents of enlightening the population, became advocates of (socialist) culture and 
education. Those cadres formed the humanistic milieu. The main goal in the lives 
of these people was the fulfilment of duties and social involvement geared to-
wards maintaining and passing on humanistic traditions. This area provided 
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advancement opportunities for people who have studied social sciences and the 
humanities, education, journalism or art and cultural studies.  
The three social milieus evolved in the first 15 years of the GDR’s existence 
and only comprised one fifth of the population overall. The socialist establish-
ment showed gratitude to the state for enabling social advancement by education 
and exercises and high degrees of loyalty towards the socialist system. The loyal-
ty of its functionaries provided one foundation for the country’s social stability. 
The experience of widespread social advancement and the establishment and 
stabilization of social elites following the war left a strong impression on an 
entire generation. Researchers conducting generational analysis of East Ger-
man society (so-called ‘generational sociologists’) describe this cohort as the 
reconstruction generation of the GDR (Aufbaugeneration, approximately born 
between 1930 and 1945). 
Figure 1: The Social Stratification of the GDR (1960)  
 
Source: Hypothetical Reconstruction of the social structure, © Hofmann. 
 
In contrast, the bulk of the traditional population, i.e. working class milieus and 
even petty bourgeois lifeworlds, had no choice but to simply coming to terms 
with the GDR’s political conditions. The working class environments, in par-
ticular, were preserved in East Germany. Right up to the end of the socialist 
state, social life was heavily shaped by these traditional proletarian and petty 
bourgeois ways of life. 
Following the conclusion of the socialist educational revolution in the mid-
1960s, the socialist establishment began to reproduce itself from within, super-
HSR 41 (2016) 3  │  322 
imposing itself on society in the later years of the GDR like a ‘lead plate’ and 
especially blocking the social advancement of younger age cohorts what had 
been during the reconstruction period the shaping experience of the first gener-
ation. Social mobility declined sharply within socialist society during the 1970s 
and 1980s – a process that is not unique to the GDR. 
3.  New Social Milieus and the Problem of Subcultures 
Although the GDR offered its younger generations a good education and a 
guaranteed level of social security, there existed merely few opportunities for 
social advancement and participation. This led to the emergence of new social 
milieus in the 1970s for which the formula of integration via social advance-
ment by education did not hold anymore. Due to international diplomatic 
recognition and the social welfare policies of Erich Honecker, the GDR’s popu-
lation was able to enjoy mass consumption, mass tourism, and Western mass 
and music culture in particular, albeit with numerous limitations and scarcities. 
Individuals, socialised during this period, were able, even in the GDR, to par-
ticipate in the ongoing modernisation of lifeworlds.  
New social milieus began to emerge in this period, but they were unable to 
establish themselves in society, for they had low chances to climb up the social 
ladder of the GDR. Lifestyles, oriented towards music or other subcultures, 
were therefore less and less in touch with or connected to the GDR: Subcultural 
milieus came into existence. They either found a niche in which they could 
cultivate their interests and their music, or they created, often under the auspi-
ces of the church, spaces for alternative, reform-oriented engagement within 
the socio-political framework of the GDR (so-called ‘alternative milieus’).  
The protagonists of the peaceful revolution in East Germany stemmed from 
these new social milieus. In this sense, the peaceful revolution exhibited some 
features of a youth rebellion against the socialist establishment. Young 
skilled workers (the hedonistic blue collar milieu), for example, were the 
single largest source of applications for emigration permits during the 1980s, 
while the young left-alternative milieus could be described as resembling a kind 
of civil rights movement. 
In terms of a generational history, the GDR was only able to successfully in-
tegrate the reconstruction generation (Aufbaugeneration) into its social struc-
tures. This is reflected in the names assigned by generational analysis to 
subsequent generational cohorts as the ‘generation without boundaries’ or the 
‘unadvised generation’ (Wierling 2002; Lindner 2006). The history of the 
GDR is distinguished by a sharply declining rate of integration for the 
younger generations.  
The SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] had from the beginning of their 
takeover focused on the youth as a carrier of building a new society. But what 
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initially largely succeeded, got from the mid-1970s more and more into a dis-
aster. The youth was the first age group that the SED could co-opt and it was 
also the first one which ran ‘out of control’ (Lindner 2003, 33). 
Figure 2: The Social Stratification of the GDR (1989)  
 
Source: Presentation of the social milieus of the GDR (Vester et al. 2001, 50). 
 
As a result of the evident decline of both industry and cities during the 1980s, 
the traditional milieus of the population began to abandon their previously held 
loyalty to the system in increasing numbers, and reformers emerged even 
among members of the socialist establishment itself. 
However, the peaceful revolution 1989/90 did not lead to an actual trans-
formation of the social relations of East Germany: The top positions of social 
stratification remained at the top, the middle classes persisted in the middle, 
and the bottom of society did not leave the lowest echelons of social structure. 
In fact, during the years of post-revolution, the social cleavages and inequali-
ties which had already existed in the GDR society only became larger.  
The transformation of eastern Germany did indeed lead to an increased level 
of social mobility; however, this social mobility did not facilitate the social 
advancement for broader sections of the population. These experiences are the 
reason why till this day less than half of the East Germans perceive the years 
since reunification as being a history primarily of gain or improvement.2 
                                                             
2  In 2014 Gunnar Winkler asked the question, “Have the years since reunification been […] for 
you?” with the following answer options: mainly gain, more gain, gain as well as loss, mostly 
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A significant factor in this process was the impression that the vast majority 
of the socialist establishment benefits from the process of German reunifica-
tion. Despite being excluded from the West German political class, German 
unification was far more successful in the upper half of society than in the 
lower half. The socialist establishment succeeded in finding a new reproductive 
base for itself within the modern service sector. They are highly qualified and 
already at the disposal of the newly emerging labour market at an early stage.  
Figure 3: Social Stratification in East Germany after Transformation (2004)  
 
Source: Ibid., 53. 
 
The numerous functionaries of party politics and social life often managed to 
secure most of the top jobs in the new emerging insurance, banking and securi-
ty industries. German reunification worked out best for (or rather for) the high-
er echelons of East German society. The socialist establishment successfully 
made the transition into the modern elite of post-socialist society, while the 
social milieus of the petty bourgeois and skilled workers underwent processes 
of ongoing shrinkage and social differentiation.  
The third significant social force, the new social milieus that had emerged in 
the GDR since the 1970s, was also unable to achieve social positions resem-
                                                                                                                                
loss, (no indication). In none of the age groups did the items mainly and more gain receive 
more than 50 % (Winkler 2015, 43). 
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bling overall social stabilisation. They went through significant social differen-
tiation. Though a modern middle class did develop in East Germany, it is sim-
ultaneously weak and comprises currently only 40% of the population, whereas 
in the West this figure approaches 60%. 
With regard to the topic at hand, the socio-structural results of East German 
transformation can be summarized in three points: 
1) Generational succession in the GDR is marked by a sharply declining rate of 
integration of younger generations in the socialist society. 
2) During the aftermath of the political upheaval in 1989/90, the former social-
ist establishment could successfully defeat their elevated social positions, 
although it was excluded from the ruling political class. 
3) The middle classes of the social stratification ran during the same time peri-
od through social differentiation and modernisation processes. However, es-
pecially the deindustrialisation of East Germany and better job chances in 
the western part of the country caused a significant population exodus in 
parts of the middle lifeworlds. That will have lasting effects on the East 
German society in the future. 
4.  A Comparison of East German and North Korean 
Generations 
4.1  The Notion of Generation 
The concept of “generation” is resorted in historical and social sciences to 
describe age groups in a region who live at the same time and have similar 
experiences. The background of common experiences and their individual 
processing lead, in theory, to similar attitudes, values and opinions. Such com-
parable life images on the base of shared experiences are what generations 
characterize. A generation does not describe an entire age group or even the 
majority of it, but especially historians use the term generation to describe 
features of groups of people in order to provide examples for enabling insight 
into social and historical processes. 
Generations are especially formed in adolescence or in young adulthood. 
During this phase of life personality is formed. This is an individual process, 
but embedded in the common background of experience of that generation. 
From this statement the conclusion can be drawn that the unifying power of 
historical situations or events, that may have a generation building effect, re-
lates to the extent and the intensity of social episodes and processes. Therefore, 
drastic historical events such as wars, revolutions or social crises are used in 
the description of generations, because it is expected that their, perhaps only 
short-term, effects on younger groups of population are stronger than that of a 
more continuous social change. 
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In the following, the hypothesis is pursued that dramatic events may have 
generation-building effects on certain age cohorts of young people. We com-
bine an age oriented approach with the question whether some indications exist 
that these group of people actually perceive their social world in some similar 
way, different to former or later cohorts. The summarizing term ‘generation’ is 
used to describe these groups. By following this well-established approach 
often used in historic science, the existence of these generations is not proved, 
but such working hypothesis is effective in interpreting empirical facts. The 
two generations in the specified sense are the “last generation” of the GDR 
(Martens 2015) and a comparable generation of young people in North Korea. 
4.2  The Last Generation of the GDR and the North Korean of the 
“Arduous March” 
Several studies analysed the age cohorts of people born in the beginning of the 
1970s till the beginning of the 1980s. These people had been socialized in the 
GDR. They experienced the political upheaval in 1989/90 and the early years of 
transformation as teenager or as child. Bernd Lindner (2006) suggested a summa-
rizing descriptive term for this age cohort. According to him it is the “unadvised 
generation.” This term denotes the circumstance that the traditional agents and 
institutions of education at least partly failed during the early transformation 
period, because they, themselves, were occupied by dealing with the social and 
political change. The unadvised generation had only the choice to master “the 
new by itself” (Lindner 2006, 112). Although this generation was indeed social-
ized in the GDR, one can assume that its identification with the socialist system 
was rather low during the 1980s. As the foregoing age cohorts, its dreams and 
interests were largely Western-oriented. The opening of the border and the uni-
fied Germany offered large new opportunities for this generation. 
Interviews with men and women of this age group give an impression that, 
for instance, new courses of academic studies that have been introduced after 
the political upheaval were perceived as “release from strictly regulated life 
paths” (Stutz 2006, 142). The need for “self-realization,” a more western influ-
enced ideal for youth times, won a real meaning for this generation. Generally, 
however, the realization of new opportunities often implied the exodus from 
East Germany. Long-term panel surveys of people born in 1973 in the GDR 
show that up until now one quarter of them has migrated to West Germany or 
abroad, primarily because of poor job opportunities in East Germany. The 
majority of them does not regret this decision, the degree of satisfaction is 
higher among emigrants than among those who stayed in East Germany (Berth 
et al. 2010, 191). 
From the temporal distance of more than two decades, four types of com-
mon experiences of the unadvised generation during the period after reunifica-
tion can be identified: 
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- Firstly, 70% of respondents of the sample of the East German age cohort 
1973 were at least once unemployed since the unification. Many of them 
have had recurrent experiences with times of unemployment. 
- Secondly, “double identities” have emerged. Many people of the unadvised 
generation “feel as Germans [citizens of the unified state], but without giv-
ing up their solidarity with the GDR” (Berth et al. 2010, 190). 
- Thirdly, this also, has to do with the GDR socialization that “has sustainable 
long-term effects.” “This especially concerns the former everyday life at the 
social level” (Berth et al. 2010, 190). Contemporary studies confirm the 
strong impact of these views of life and narrations also on subsequent age 
cohorts (Martens 2015). 
- Fourthly, current social problems in Germany are often compared with the 
situation in the GDR, but this does not mean that one wants to install the old 
system again. These comparisons seem to be an opportunity to criticize and 
discuss today’s issues in Germany (for example the educational or health 
policy). 
For North Korea a succession of generations is discussed, which certainly have 
similarities to proposals for the generation structure for the GDR (Table 1): 
Table 1: Generations in the German Democratic Republic and in North Korea 
GDR North Korea 
Generation of mistrustful patriachs (1895-
1910) 
Generation of the anti-Japanese struggle 
(from 1910) 
Reconstruction generation (1930-44) Generation of the Korean War (from 1930) 
Integrated generation (1945-59) Generation of leaders of the cultural revolution (from 1950) 
Reserved generation (1960-74) Generation of the “arduous march” (from 1970) 
Unadvised generation (from 1975) ??? 
Sources: Ahbe and Gries (2011); Lindner (2006); Cho et al. (2014). 
 
In the following we will restrict our attention to age cohorts that were presum-
ably affected by social change in some way similar to the last generation of the 
GDR. People born around between 1985 and the 1990s witnessed the suffering 
of the great famine in North Korea, the so called “arduous march,” as a child or 
adolescent. This age group currently comprises approximately a quarter of the 
North Korean population. Presumably in 2023, the proportion of people with 
an age under 40 years will reach about 55% (in 2013 this percentage was 45%, 
Cho et al. 2014, 19). The importance of younger generations will therefore 
increase in North Korea. 
There is consent in research on North Korea that the “arduous march” repre-
sented a deep societal incision in North Korean history. During the period 
1995-97, according to unconfirmed sources, up to 2 million people died (Frank 
2015, 564), representing about 8% of the population. A severe famine in a 
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relatively highly industrialized country whose economic growth rates in the late 
1950s were probably the highest in the world and its standard of living was up 
to the 1960s higher than South Korea’s (Armstrong 2014, 428) is a historic 
singularity. Nevertheless, this event fits into a long-term global trend. Accord-
ing to Charles Armstrong (2014, 415), the arduous march depicted the sad 
North Korean culmination of global developments since the 1970s. “The eco-
nomic catastrophe of the 1990s was also the crisis of the industrial city in North 
Korea, and a belated effect of the crisis of industrial modernism throughout the 
world that begun in the 1970s.” The widespread transformation of industrial 
economy visible by the emergence of “rust belts” of old industrial sites across 
different countries, and the end of cheap energy were global economic trends, 
which ultimately contributed also to the dissolution of the socialist system of 
states and the Soviet Union. 
The North Korean political system survived this decline in the early 1990s 
and the succeeding famine, however. Astonishingly, the societal catastrophe of 
the “arduous march” even won a socially unifying force during its aftermath, 
similar to the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) in the Soviet Union. “As further 
history has shown, ‘the spirit of the arduous march’ at the height of Great Famine 
of the late 1990s-early 2000s proved to be one of the most successful propaganda 
campaigns in the DPRK’s history” (Gabroussenko 2014, 3). In accordance with 
the official North Korean interpretation, the nation had jointly overcome a serious 
existential crisis and together drew new strength. This official North Korean 
interpretation is presently the single one, although the “arduous march” (com-
parable to the Great Patriotic War) can also be interpreted as a partial collapse 
of state’s and party’s organisations (Gabroussenko 2014). 
Economically, North Korea faced a de-industrialization in the 1990s which 
could be observed in various transition countries, too, although there are much 
less dramatic economic implications. The food shortages affected just the old 
North Korean industrial centres. The agriculture became more important, and 
markets originally initiated in the early 1990s came more into existence to 
provide food supply in the aftermath of the famine. 
If one tries to classify this historical situation, the “arduous march” is an ab-
rupt event, a profound social disaster that had in particular hit the population of 
industrialized regions. Its effect on social life and on the individual is only 
comparable to a war. In contrast to that, the process of marketization denotes a 
continuous economic and social change. Corresponding to theory, the “arduous 
march” should have had a generation creating influence, because of its overall 
effect on society, while the marketization should have rather won an impact on 
the socialization of young people, for whom various types of markets became 
part of their usual everyday life. 
Consequently, the authors of a recent publication of the Korea Institute for Na-
tional Unification (KINU) on “The emergence of a new generation” in North 
Korea state that the generation forming experience of the “arduous march” was 
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the collapse of state power (which contradicts the official interpretation of this 
societal disaster). In this study the age cohorts of a “generation of the arduous 
march” are younger than that of the previously mentioned proposal of a general 
generational scheme for North Korea. We will use this suggestion of the KINU in 
the following, because it provides some comparative opportunities.  
The individual and its family could no longer rely on the state’s distribution 
system, instead they had to be active for themselves (Cho et al. 2014). Accord-
ing to Lee and Kwak (2014, 631), social “survival networks” had fundamental-
ly changed in North Korea before and after the 1990s: Previously, the local 
party organization, labour relations, management and family had been im-
portant. The orientation of social life at the workplace could also be observed 
in the GDR and other socialist countries. After the “arduous march,” the situa-
tion in North Korea entirely changed: Markets, the family, and relatives were 
now central to survival networks. It seems to be a growing tension between 
these survival networks and the official interpretation of the great famine that 
“downplays the role of blood ties and real families,” instead “it presents a col-
lective and a society in the mode of classic good family” (Gabroussenko 2014). 
It remains an open question how these contradictions are solved within the 
North Korean society.  
At the same time, the famine had hit families very existentially: “The ex-
treme shortage of food during the economic crisis, death and illness of family 
members, and the participation of women in economic activities, has signifi-
cantly decreased the stability of family and increased the dissolution of fami-
lies” (Cho et al. 2014, 20). However, to which extent the individual and family 
traumas of that time had actually formed a generation, cannot currently be 
answered, because statements of or studies on the affected individuals are lack-
ing. Additionally, the state succeeded in pushing a heroic interpretation of the 
arduous march that devaluated individual catastrophes and family ties. 
Processes of marketization have been in existence for almost 20 years in North 
Korea, hence one has to assume that it became a usual socializing environment of 
a hypothetical generation forming during the “arduous march” as well as later age 
cohorts. Accordingly, it is assumed in the already mentioned KINU publication 
that markets are common for these younger populations, not only for basic sup-
ply, but for them a “market environment is a space of consumption, a space of 
communication, a space of sense, and a space of desire”(Cho et al. 2014, 34). At 
the same time, however, this marketization and a wider variety of information 
about the world outside apparently are not connected with criticism of the politi-
cal system or opposition.  
Despite the fact they [the young people] become aware of a different world 
through foreign culture, the acceptance and propensity towards foreign culture 
do not lead to direct criticisms of the system. This is because the gap between 
their reality and the foreign world which is conveyed through culture is too 
large (Cho et al. 2014, 26).  
HSR 41 (2016) 3  │  330 
Even among North Korean refugees in China, the approval for the official 
policy is, according to South Korean surveys, surprisingly high. According to 
South Korean sources, the agreement to Kim Jong-un’s policy reaches 50-60% 
among North Korean refugees in China (information of South Korean co-
operation partners, November 2014). Although it is emphasized that the young-
er generation is rather apolitical and that it nevertheless feels a gap between the 
official language rules and its personal daily life (Cho et al. 2014, 24).  
Not only markets have meanwhile become part of everyday life of the 
younger generation, but also the perception and experience with some of its 
unintended consequences, such as poverty, regional and social inequalities. 
Such differences would be accepted and used for personal distinction gains, as 
it is also common in Western societies among young people: “Among the new 
generation, there exists a differentiation of hierarchy and class through one’s 
cultural taste imitation, and representation” (Cho et al. 2014, 31). 
Based on 40 interviews with North Korean refugees born between 1985 and 
the late 1990s, case studies are created that are summarised to three types of 
generation affected by the arduous march (Cho et al. 2014, 54): 
The first type can be called social outsiders. Traumatizing experiences as 
death of family members were common for this group of people, and these 
events led to disintegrative tendencies of the families in question. Different 
types of deviant behaviour of adolescents and young adults can be observed in 
the sample. This behaviour even includes criminal acts. 
Adaptable young people build the second type. They willingly meet the formal 
social and political requirements of the North Korean society, apparently not only 
to achieve personal success and benefit, but also because of conviction. The 
escape from North Korea seems to be in this context as a random event and par-
tially stands in a strange contrast to the previous life of these persons. 
The third type seems to be adapted at the first glance, but the North Korean 
“normality” is in essence solely outward. These adolescents and young adults 
test various strategies to undermine the officially tolerated behaviour for their 
personal benefits. Accordingly, this third type represents a fragile normality 
that gives hints for some hidden frictions within the North Korean society. 
It is not possible to compute statistical distributions of these types. The 
study delivers a qualitative exploration of a hypothetical generation effected by 
the “arduous march” on a quite small empirical base. 
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Table 2: Comparison of the Unadvised Generation the Generation of the 
Arduous March 
Aspects Unadvised generation Generation of the arduous march 
Age cohorts 1970-85 
Born after 1970, in the KINU 
study about 1985 till the late 
1990s 
Generation 
forming event 
The political upheaval of 1989/90 
in the GDR 
The severe famine in North Korea, 
1995-97 
Primary effects Uncertainties, new options 
Comprehensive existential crisis, 
loss of family members and other 
related persons, signs of social 
disintegration, probably psychic 
traumata 
Experience 
previously 
Childhood and youth in “socialis-
tic paths” influenced by Western 
culture and media, partly some 
kind of “double life”, everyday life 
in the GDR and cultural orienta-
tion at the West, family cohesion 
against political and societal 
spheres, private niches, but also 
opposition against the state 
Childhood and youth in “socialis-
tic paths”, strong separation 
against foreign influences and 
information, strong position of 
official institutions in comparison 
to family structures 
Experiences 
afterwards 
Transformation period, individual-
ization, new freedom and oppor-
tunities, but also new social 
problems, for example unem-
ployment, parents and teachers 
are seen as weak, “phantom pains” 
(Lindner 2006,112), because of 
the suddenly disappeared GDR 
Marketization, regional and social 
inequalities, declining importance 
of the workplace, of the party and 
of the administration for coping 
everyday life, growing impact of 
markets, families and relatives for 
survival, at the same partly disso-
lution of family structures owing 
to death of relatives, more infor-
mation about foreign countries, 
but no indications of a declining 
loyalty to the political system 
 
Finally we confront the unadvised generation with the generation of the “ar-
duous march” (Table 2). There are similarities, but the differences outweigh in 
some decisive topics. 
- The “arduous march” was a social disaster whose effects were comparable 
to a war. In contrast to that, the social upheaval of 1989/90 will have had far 
less traumatizing effects, especially on families and the youth. 
- A long time before the social change actually occurred in the GDR, the 
country was socially and economically destabilized. Symptoms of these 
processes were the growing alienation of young people and their cultural 
orientation to the west. The same cannot be depicted in the case of North 
Korea. The country instead survived the collapse of the socialist system of 
states and the catastrophe of the “arduous march” became, according to the 
recent official interpretation, the unifying heroic test of the nation. 
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- Partly, processes that can be observed in North Korea after the “arduous 
march” began in the GDR before the political change of 1989/90: the grow-
ing importance of kinship in contrast to administration and party as well as 
easier access to foreign information and cultural goods. 
- The crucial difference – that has also been raised in the part of this paper 
about social structures – seems to be that new information sources and ac-
cess to foreign cultures do not visibly undermine the loyalty of younger 
generations to the state and the political system in North Korea. At the mo-
ment it cannot be estimated how fragile this normality is. There is an ongo-
ing discussion in the North Korea research on the stability of the political 
system. During the last years the point of view has become stronger which, 
for example, Dae-Sook Suh uttered at a conference in 2014. “North Korea is 
an underdeveloped, poor, and isolated country, but its political system is re-
silient and stable” (Suh 2014, 32). In comparative perspective one can add 
that this resilience denotes a remarkable and decisive contrast to the GDR. 
5.  Conclusions: Three Questions Arise from the Comparison 
of the Development in the GDR and North Korea 
When comparing the depicted developments to conditions in North Korea, the 
following questions arise: 
1. Can the GDR’s socialist establishment be compared to the nomenklatura, 
the circles of political leadership in North Korea? Does a socialist establish-
ment also exist in North Korea? 
In North Korea, primarily the military elites and political functionaries, 
which originally emerged during the liberation struggle against Japan and again 
in the course of the Korean War, were engaged in and responsible for recon-
struction and the subsequent reconstruction period. These functionaries enjoyed 
unique political privileges and are given exceptional status as revolutionary 
leaders to this day. 
This military-political establishment was reinforced and expanded by the 
leaders of the cultural revolution of the 1970s and 1980s. In any case, we can 
safely assume that North Korean society is not divided into a very small ruling 
clique on one side and the traditional (people’s) milieus on the other, but rather 
that North Korean society also comprises larger social milieus which are ap-
parently loyal to the state. These groups can be conceived of as North Korea’s 
socialist establishment. The scale of this establishment, that is to say the per-
centage of the population that belongs to the North Korean socialist establish-
ment, has yet to be determined. Nevertheless, this establishment will likely play 
an important role in any process of Korean re-unification due to its elevated 
educational and social status. 
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2. In the GDR, new (alternative) lifeworlds emerged that were strongly con-
nected to and were identified themselves with the Western world’s orientations 
in terms of consumption and social values. These lifeworlds ultimately became 
important actors during the political upheaval in East Germany. Are there simi-
lar lifeworlds oriented towards Western consumption and social values devel-
oping in North Korea? 
The relative isolation of North Korea from both the Western world as well 
as from relatives and family members in South Korea makes a shift in values 
and a revitalisation of the cultural awakening of the 1970s by the citizens of 
North Korea rather unlikely. The relevant question, then, is whether cultural 
counter-worlds, alternative thinking or networks of individuals interested in 
international culture or music were able to develop in North Korea over the 
past 20 years. Lee and Koo (2015) discuss some conditions for emerging an 
“unofficial culture” in North Korea in opposition to the domestic official cul-
ture. They mention:  
- growing values of property and wealth among the population;  
- the influence of trade with foreign countries (one can often read in North 
Korean literature that foreign culture and products are a “scale for good 
quality” [Lee and Koo 2015, 486]);  
- the emergence of young generations that are, for instance, alienated by the 
failures of state during the “arduous march”;  
- a decline of official education;  
- the increasing use of new media that would find their way to North Korea, 
although they are officially forbidden;  
- the marketization which, for example, produces new not controllable net-
works between people;  
- and growing segregation of society.  
But the authors do not confirm that the unofficial culture, which they assume 
being already in existence, has currently been turned towards a culture of re-
sistance. So far, at least, there has been no evidence of an intellectual counter-
elite in opposition to the socialist establishment emerging in North Korea.  
When discussing North Korea, it would make sense to ask what long-term ef-
fects growing markets and the significantly expanded social strata of merchants 
and traders will have on the emergence of alternative modes of thinking and 
autonomous ways of life. It is undecided whether an increasing orientation to-
wards Western standards of consumption will produce growing popular pressure 
to be permit leaving the country and travelling freely, as happened in the GDR.  
3. Finally, we should ask: Will North Korea exhibit a similar decline in the 
integration of younger generations as was the case in the GDR? 
In contrast to the GDR, in North Korea each new generation seems to expe-
rience major historic events which had possibly had a constituting generative 
effect on some age cohorts. Even the famine of the 1990s (which can be at-
tributed, at least in part, to failures of the state) thus became a national chal-
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lenge whose overcoming were laid in the responsibility of everyone, including 
the young generation. As mentioned, some authors suppose the existence of an 
“unofficial culture” especially among the youth as a prerequisite of possible 
resistance in the future. Other studies reveal a “fragile normality” among young 
people who seem to be well adapted to North Korean society, however under 
this surface “deviant behaviour” contradicts the normality. But there exists a 
remarkable divergence to the GDR: Up to date, no declining levels of integra-
tion of younger age cohorts can be observed in North Korea.  
Capitalism had shown in the course of the 20th century its extraordinary 
characteristic of integrating opposing youth cultures as well as transforming, 
for example, original subversive underground movements into entertainment 
business. Currently, it remains open, whether North Korean society will resist 
the maelstrom of western culture and exhibit the integrative power in regard to 
younger generations in the future. 
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